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Abstract. The article examines the use of discretionary production by key OPEC members to 
protect the long-term value of their reserves.  Although interpretations vary on its behaviour 
and market power, the organisation sees its role as promoting the security of supply 
through stabilising markets while protecting market share and ensuring a fair return to 
capital. Given the new and perennial challenges facing its members, there are diverse views 
on how these policy objectives may be promoted.  Using option theory, we argue that the 
market stabilisation policy of OPEC in effect, provides free risk management to the global 
market and conflicts fundamentally with its long-term objective of protecting market share 
through discouraging high-cost marginal producers.   Abandoning this policy, the returns to 
marginal producers, adjusted for risk, would be reduced. As implications of our research, 
rather than creating a social good through mitigating price risk, OPEC should allow markets 
to be volatile and even consider using its discretionary buffer in a pro-cyclic manner, to 
protect the long-term value of its reserves.  
Keywords. OPEC, Risk Management, Shale Petroleum. 
JEL. Q02, Q43, Q48, Q58. 
 
1. Introduction  
he objectives and strategies of the petroleum exporting nations 
comprising the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) has long been a subject of research and inquiry.  Even before 
it was founded in 1960, there were concerns in the United States that the 
organisation’s future members would use bountiful reserves and low 
production costs to compete “unfairly” with domestic producers who 
clamoured for tariff protection from “cheap foreign crude” (Yergin, 1990). 
Measuring its market power and how it may be used has been a topic of 
on-going debate. In the 1970s, scenarios involving concerted effort to 
reduce or with-hold production by OPEC members, extracting economic 
rents from Western consumers, figured in planning exercises (Jefferson, 
2012).  Meanwhile, other researchers notably Professor Morris Adelman 
(1979) saw OPEC as an ineffectual cartel and unlikely to survive. In the 
1980s it was believed that OPEC would fall apart through internal 
dissension (Goldstein, 1983).  Others have highlighted the challenges faced 
by the organisation in pursuing oligopolistic pricing behaviour 
(MacFadyen, 1993). During the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it was 
believed that conventional oil supplies were approaching exhaustion or 
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“peaking”, we saw renewed fears of OPEC with-holding production 
alongside worries over security of supply and price stability (Campbell & 
Laherrère, 1998). Today, concerns continue over the role of the 
Organisation and its effect on non-OPEC producers (Cairns & Calfucura, 
2012).  Since the new Millennium, the combination of slow growth in global 
oil consumption, output from new producing regions and the global 
decarbonisation agenda have become profound threats to the Organisation. 
Views vary widely on how it should respond or what strategy to pursue 
(Barnett & Dessai, 2004). But, running through discussions of OPEC 
strategies and their efficacy, is the supposition that the pursuit of market 
stability is crucial to ensuring markets for their approximately 30 mmbd of 
production while maximising the value of future production. 
Although the objectives of OPEC are often portrayed as being at odds 
with the economic interests of energy importing countries, from the 
perspective of the Organisation itself its mission “…is to coordinate and 
unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries and ensure the 
stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers 
and a fair return on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry 
(OPEC, 2012). ”Despite occasional dissent from some of its members, from 
inception OPEC has been a reliable supplier of both crude oil and products 
to the global market. Through maintaining a key position in supply, 
providing price guidance to non-members and adjusting discretionary 
output to stabilise markets, the Organisation has sought, officially, to 
balance the needs of consumers with those of producers (Horn, 2004). 
Indeed, rather than abusing its market power pro-actively, according to 
some researchers, the organisation tends towards re-activity, responding to 
markets, often with delays (Kisswani, 2016; Mellios & Andriosopoulos, 
2016).   
Views differ on how OPEC should maximise the value of its massive 
reserves and low production costs. Should its members keep prices 
moderate to discourage alternatives and hold market share (Cairns & 
Calfucura, 2012)? Or, should it try to preserve revenue at higher prices 
though it may lead to the erosion of market share and encourage 
production from new sources, conservation and new technologies? 
Formally, should short-term sacrifices in revenue be made as a form of 
protective investment in exchange for potential benefits accruing over time in 
conformity with Samuelson’s discounted utility model (Samuelson, 1937).  
Or, should OPEC’s pursue a myopic or even time insensitive approach 
(Kunreuther, Onculer & Slovic, 1998)? Although probable reserves have 
been increased, other estimates of proven reserves lend weight to adopting 
a short-term perspective in order to maximise remaining value (Simmons, 
2005). But how should “cheating”, or non-adherence to allocated 
production quotas by members, be handled? What role should Saudi 
Arabia and the Emirate States, acting as “swing” or discretionary 
producers, assume? What strategy would supportthe latest plans of Saudi 
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Arabia to broaden and diversify the country’s economic base (Vision 2030, 
[Retrieved from])? Wouldcontinuing its role as swing producer, promoting 
market discipline among members, while absorbing natural market shocks, 
be compatible with the ambitions for the Gulf States of creating sufficient 
reserves to transition their economies away from petroleum dependence 
(Korybko, 2017)? In sum, for OPEC as whole and its individual members, 
what strategy would support maximising the value of its reserves, remains 
open to discussion. 
In addition to the perennial concerns of OPEC, important secular trends 
and events have created further complications.  The rise of new production 
from non-member countries and the de-carbonisation agenda represent 
unsettling challenges to strategy and aspirations.  Such developments were 
difficult to anticipate. While the exploitation of the Canadian tar sands, the 
Artic seas and deep off-shore Brazil had long development times, the 
modern exploitation of petroleum from “tight formations “, shale oil from 
the Permian, Marcellus and Bakken basins in the United States, was a 
surprise [Retrieved from]. Moreover, the coincidence of the “Arab Spring”, 
reducing output from key OPEC members thereby making a place for new 
sources of production, could not have been not predicted.  The emergence 
of the United States as the world’s largest producer of petroleum, greater 
than both Saudi Arabia and Russia, has been a matter of consternation (FT, 
20-3-18). Reflecting the set rends and events, in the last decade, Brent crude 
prices have been as high as $144 per barrel and as low as $26.00 per barrel, 
averaging $82 for the period. Squeezed between these trends and new 
domestic economic pressures to diversify their economies and reduce 
resource dependence (FT, 20-3-18, the upsurge in output by non-OPEC 
members has sharpened the dilemma facing the Organisation: higher prices 
are needed to protect revenue but may lead to a loss of market share, as 
marginal producers are encouraged. Attempting to establish higher prices 
through some members such as Saudi Arabia reducing output and 
foregoing revenues, might help in the short term but, over time it, may 
encourage marginal production from higher cost producers.   
Recognising these new challenges, in 2015, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
adopted a fresh tactic and ramped up production to nearly 10.5 mmb/d 
with the hope of forcing marginal producers to exit the market (Ansari, 
2017). To paraphrase the comments of the Saudi Oil Minister, Khalid al-
Falih, rather than adjusting supply to support prices, it would aim to 
protect market share using low-cost production to drive-out marginal 
producers (Bloomberg, 2016).  The consequent fall in the price of crude oil 
was designed to defend market share, test the resilience of shale oil 
production and the competitiveness of alternative technologies (Oil Price, 
2015). On the whole, the strategy was not successful and shale production 
from the United States has continued to increase, having more than 
doubled since 2010 while its cost of production has steadily declined.  For 
the core members of OPEC, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, the challenge of 
preserving market share while protecting revenues has never been greater. 
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Faced with these challenges, what strategy should the Organisation pursue, 
especially its largest producers, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, the 
members with the greatest scope for adjusting production and exports? 
Confronting these circumstances, various researchers have investigated 
alternative strategies for OPEC. Before the current threat from shale 
production, it was argued that to protect profits, OPEC must expand 
output and maintain its share of global markets (Gately, 2007). More 
recently, however the focus has turned to defensive positions and 
preserving solidarity among members but recommendations vary on how 
best to respond to new production and stagnant growth in demand. 
OPEC’s leading producer, Saudi Arabia has repeatedly attempted to 
coordinate export reductions with both OPEC members and the National 
Oil Companies from non-member countries like Russia (Bloomberg, 2016; 
Financial Times 27-3-18). But according to researchers, the scope for OPEC 
to act in an anti-competitive manner and support prices, is limited (Alhajjia 
and Huettnerb, 2000).Other researchers have argued that OPEC should 
adopt a defensive strategy to protect market share (Alkhathlan, Gately & 
Javid 2016). And further, that the wisdom of ceding market share to new 
entrants to stabilise markets, is self-defeating, undermining the scope for 
market leadership (Alkhathlan, Gately & Javid, 2016). 
It has been argued that Saudi Arabia should use its own considerable 
storage capacity estimated at 12 million barrels to maintain cohesion or 
accommodate deficits from other producers (Cairns & Calfucura, 2012).  
Emphasising the importance of market stability, researchers have 
investigated the role of surplus production capacity in stabilising the price 
for petroleum (Pierru, Smith & Zamrik, 2017).  Looking at the role of four 
OPEC members, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, these authors 
examined the role of the discretionary output buffer of approximately 2 
mmbd used to absorb secular perturbations to supply and demand. The 
authors argue that maintaining this buffer supports the mission of the 
Organisation to stabilise markets and demonstrate its trustworthiness as a 
supplier.  Notwithstanding the efforts of the Gulf States, other researchers 
have argued that the actions of other OPEC members, such as trying to gain 
effective market share through discounting, has undermined long-term 
prospects (Brown & Huntington, 2017). From a global perspective, the same 
authors argue that oil security would be enhanced through diversification 
and reducing upon OPEC production.  But might there be a different 
strategy for OPEC to both retain market share and maximise the value of 
reserves? 
According to OPEC itself, their strategy continues to be one of 
coordinating and unifying petroleum policies among member countries to 
ensure an efficient and reliable supply of petroleum to consuming 
countries while ensuring a fair return to the petroleum industry (OPEC, 
2017).  As expressed in their official Long-Term Strategy document, OPEC 
remains committed to market stability and security of supply (ibid). 
Furthermore, the Organization plans to continue investment and expansion 
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of production capacity to meet both expected growth in demand while 
maintaining an adequate level of spare capacity to absorb market shocks 
although how such capacity may be used to discourage new entrants and 
marginal producers, remains uncertain. Whether such plans are compatible 
with efforts to diversify their economic bases and reduce dependence upon 
petroleum, is also unclear. Altogether, for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, 
faced with fiscal pressures and challenging demographics, the time-worn 
strategies do not look auspicious: protecting market share through cutting 
prices while sacrificing revenue; or reducing output to support prices and 
ultimately revenues, ushering in new competition (IMF, 2017). To address 
these alternatives, we analyse OPEC strategy taking fresh methodological 
perspective.  Using this perspective, we consider the scope for the swing 
producers of OPEC to pursue an alternative strategy. Might there be a better 
way for OPEC to protect both its market share and prices while 
discouraging marginal, high-cost production? In this research, we combine 
financial option theory with some recent insights from the industrial 
organisation literature on the importance of analysing competitor 
behaviour, on risk-adjusted basis (Leautier & Rochet, 2014).   
 
2. OPEC behaviour in retrospect 
As described above, over the years, OPEC has adjusted output to protect 
prices, absorb shocks and protect market.  As regularly reported, through 
using approximately 2 mmb/d of lifting capacity in a discretionary manner 
(Petroleum Economist, 2005, 2012, 2016, 2018), the core members of OPEC, 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates States, have pursued the goal of stable 
markets. Although losing granularity with annual data, we see how OPEC 
production as a percentage of total production has varied over time. Like 
other cartels through history, a discretionary production buffer has been 
used to support prices, withdrawing supply when prices were too low and 
increasing production when prices became too high (Reynolds & 
Pippenger, 2010). Like other cartels it has tried to enforce pricing discipline 
using quota allocations among members while trying to influence 
producers who are non-members.  Notwithstanding such efforts however, 
a key problem for OPEC is that its total output is only about a third of total 
global requirements; its role is important but not pivotal (Alhajji & 
Huettner, 2000).   
 
Turkish Economic Review 
L. Haar, TER, 6(1), 2019, p.1-13. 
6 
6 
 
 
Figure 1.  OPEC Production as Percentage of Total Production, Brent spot Crude Prices  
 Source: US DOE-EIA. [Retrieved from].  
 
At a macro-economic level, it has been argued that the stabilising role of 
swing producers of OPEC provides global benefits of approximately USD 
20 billion per annum in the short term in avoided costs, depending upon 
elasticity assumptions, may be (Pierru, Smith & Zamrik, 2017).  These 
results are consistent with the work from Oxford Economics [Retrieved 
from]. But this is a measure of the economic benefits of the avoided supply 
short-fall.  It does not measure the benefits of market stability or reduction 
in price volatility. Although OPEC has a committed itself to stable markets 
emphasising the benefits to global consumers, we ask whether stabilising 
markets and reducing price volatility through adjusting output helps the 
Organisation itself? Apart from the benefits to consumers from stable 
prices, we ask whether pursuing stable marketshas not also been indirectly 
beneficial to marginal, high-cost produces? 
We argue that by varying output through the use of discretionary buffer, 
reducing price volatility through stabilising markets, OPEC has created a 
public good to the global economy in addition to the macro-benefits of 
avoided supply disruption. Data on price volatility in of itself is not 
conclusive and as we see in Figure 2 and Table 1 below, price volatility has 
varied considerably over time: 
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Figure 2. 30 Day Volatility - Brent Crude 
Source: US DOE-EIA. [Retrieved from].  
 
Table 1. Brent Crude Oil Volatility (Source: Authors’ calculations) 
KEY STATISTICS BRENT CRUDE OIL VOLATILITY 7-1987 to 4-2018 
Average 33% 
Minimum 9% 
Maximum 145% 
Standard. Deviation 15% 
 
It is not possible to say from the data by how much the actions of the 
Gulf States through adjusting their buffer, have reduced volatility.  As we 
see in Figure 2, after rising from mid-2014 up to 2016, price volatility for 
crude oil has followed a downward trend. What volatility might have been 
without intervention by the Gulf States is naturally counterfactual.  
Notwithstanding, we can observe that if high-cost producers sought to 
protect their revenues and hedge a portion of their production, it would 
have had a cost.  Further, even if marginal producers were not engaged in a 
hedging program, by making their returns riskier, their cost of capital 
would have been greater.  Using option theory, we can quantify benefits of 
risk reduction. The plot of Figure 3 below shows that for every 1% 
reduction in volatility, for example from 50% to 49%, the price of single 
option to hedge the position falls by approximately $0.23.2 By dampening 
price volatility through the operation of a buffer, OPEC has reduced the 
costs of hedging and/or lowered the cost of capital for exploration and 
production activities.   In sum, the organisation has provided the benefits of 
risk management to the worlds’ consumers and producers the value of 
which may be quantified using financial option theory.  
 
 
2 Using DerivaGem software the Vega, ∂Price/∂ Volatility=0.23.  For every 1% change in 
volatility, the price of the option changes by approximately $0.23.  We assume a risk-free 
rate of 3%, strike price = market price of $60 USD per barrel, expiry one year.   
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Figure 3. Option price against Volatility.  Assuming a risk-free rate of 3%, strike price = 
market price of $60 USD per barrel, expiry one year.  Authors’ calculation using 
DerivaGem© Software  
 
On a volume of 2 mmbd, the amount used by the Gulf States as a buffer 
stock, we calculate the costs of a long straddle position, consisting of a long 
call and a long put as would be used to hedge price volatility (Hull, 2012). 
We use the latest 30 -day volatility for Brent Spot Crude Oil of 30% from 
the International Commodity Exchange to compute hedging costs.3Rather 
than adjusting a buffer of 2 mmbd in capacity, we suppose the same 
amount were hedged, to stabilise markets. Although market price volatility 
is not eliminated through the operation of a buffer stock, it is reduced. Of 
course, an individual firm reducing its exposure to price volatility through 
hedging is not the same as making the overall market less volatile through 
operating a buffer but we propose that option theory may be used to value 
the benefit in risk reduction. Assuming a one-year hedging program, we 
find, as shown in Figure 2 below, that eliminating volatility on one-million 
barrels would have a cost of slightly more than USD 1 billion annually 
while hedging 2 million barrels annually would have a cost of nearly USD 
2 billion annually. In reducing market price volatility, these results capture 
how markets value improved price stability. So, in addition to the $20 
billion of benefits quantified by previous researchers, there is a positive risk 
management externality in OPEC’s behaviour. 
By operating a buffer to stabilise price shocks, Saudi Arabia and the core 
members of OPEC are in effect providing the benefits of risk management 
services to the global petroleum market using their discretionary 
production:  Increasing output as prices rise and cutting output when 
prices fall according to its stated mission. Had marginal producers 
undertaken their own hedging programs, it would have been at a 
significant cost. Or, if not undertaken, it would have increased their cost of 
capital given risk tolerance of private investors. Through using its 
discretionary capacity as a buffer to dampen market volatility, OPECs’ 
 
3
 Annualised Volatility is computed from the thirty-day average of standard deviations in 
percentage changes in daily prices, multiplied by √252, trading days per year (Hull, 2012). 
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swing producers generate social benefits in price volatility reduction to 
marginal producers and the global economy.  Given the low-cost nature of 
OPECs output, moreover, it is almost surprising that a price stabilisation 
strategy, was pursued (Reynolds, 1999). In other extractive industries, 
managing price risk has been shown to be important for high-cost 
producers, not low-cost ones (Tufano, 1996). We further note, holding 
volume in storage as a buffer, has an opportunity cost in financial terms.   
 
 
Figure 4. Annual Cost to Swing Producer of Reducing Market Volatility 2.0 mmb/d 
(Assuming an initial annualised volatility of 30%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using DerivGem© Software. 
  
To illustrate the benefit to global consumers and producers of OPEC 
providing price risk management, we can explore the impact at a firm level.  
Using data for the largest shale oil producers in North Americawe compute 
the following results, shown in Table 1.   
 
Table 2. Financial Impact of Hedging (Source: Authors’ calculations using SEC Filed 
Annual Reports, 2017) 
 
 
The results show at firm level, the gains from eliminating petroleum 
price volatility.  Of course, we do not know with precision the extent to 
which existing margins and profitability already reflect risk mitigation 
efforts. Further, it is counter-factual what market volatility might have 
prevailed, had the swing producers of OPEC not utilised or had been 
perceived as willing to utilise their buffer capacity to reduce market 
volatility. But, if for example Cabot Oil & Gas had conducted its own 
hedging program using a volatility hedge, as described above, it would 
have cost the firm nearly $300 million per annum or approximately 16% of 
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$500.000.000 
$1.000.000.000 
$1.500.000.000 
$2.000.000.000 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 99%
Volatility Reduction
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mmb/d (Assuming an initial annualised volatility of 30%)
MAJOR NORTH 
AMERICAN SHALE OIL 
PRODUCERS
RETURN 
ON EQUITY 
(2017)
PROFIT 
MARGIN 
(2017
THEORETICAL 
ANNUAL 
HEDGING COST 
ANNUAL REVENUE 
(2017)
ANNUAL REVENUE 
NET OF HEDGING 
COST
PERCENT 
REDUCTION IN 
REVENUE WITH 
HEDGING
ADJUSTED 
PROFIT MARGIN 
WITH HEDGING
ADJUSTED 
ROE WITH 
HEDGING
Apache Corporation 18.25% 22.51% 167,877,025$      5,890,000,000$     5,722,122,975$      3% 21.87% 17.73%
Cabot Oil & Gas 3.94% 5.73% 285,164,398$      1,740,000,000$     1,454,835,602$      16% 4.79% 3.29%
Devon Energy 8.04% 6.53% 1,432,257,388$   13,730,000,000$   12,297,742,612$    10% 5.85% 7.20%
EOG Resources 17.07% 22.80% 585,563,794$      11,290,000,000$   10,704,436,206$    5% 21.62% 16.18%
New Field Exploration 36.40% 24.17% 144,280,809$      1,770,000,000$     1,625,719,191$      8% 22.20% 33.43%
Pioneer Energy 7.68% 15.74% 1,884,014,580$   5,290,000,000$     3,405,985,420$      36% 10.13% 4.94%
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revenues.   On the whole, these results are consistent with the finding that 
because revenue functions are concave in output prices, corporate risk 
management enhances firm value (Mackay & Moeller, 2007). 
 
3. Policy implications and conclusions  
Applying option theory to analyse OPEC’s pursuit of price stability also 
suggests an alternative strategy for the OPEC cartel. Although the 
Organisation appears committed to stabilising markets, whether it is the 
best strategy to preserve market share while ensuring adequate revenues to 
its members, may be debatable. OPEC would like to see higher price levels 
but such prices encourage exploration and production from high-cost 
producers, like U.S. shale oil producers, Canadian tar-sands and deep off-
shore, ultimately leading to lower prices through greater supply. Critically, 
by operating a buffer to dampen price volatility and stabilise markets, in 
effect providing risk management, OPEC enhances the risk adjusted returns 
to marginal, high-cost producers, reducing their own need to hedge. 4  
According to the consultancy Wood Mackenzie, the average break-even 
well-head costs of oil production in both the Lower 48 states of the United 
States and the Gulf of Mexico, is just below $50 per barrel at the well-head 
while that of Canadian tar-sands, is marginally greater at around $52.  
Critically, production costs by individual basins, the range is greater (Wood 
Makenzie, 20-3-18). In 2017 the observed standard deviation for the spot 
price of West Texas Intermediate was approximately $3 per barrel.  Thus, 
from today’s price levels, it would not require a large movement in prices, 
to render a considerable portion of North American production 
uneconomic, underscoring the importance of price stability to marginal 
producers. Moreover, the risk-tolerance of high-cost competitors, such as 
shale producers, is lower than that of OPEC itself.   
The research illustrates the importance of using the two parameters of 
expected prices and their variance to analyse OPEC behaviour. Our main 
contributions are the following: 
a. We show that the market stabilisation activities of OPEC’s swing 
producers represent a form of price risk management which is beneficial to 
high-cost, marginal producers; 
b. We learn that if such producers were to under-take their own 
hedging programs to safe-guard revenues, it would reduce profitability; 
and 
c. We observe that the financial performance of high-cost oil 
producers on a risk adjusted basis would be lower in the absence of either 
OPEC price stabilisation or company level hedging activity.   
 
4 It is standard practice in capital budgeting to compute returns adjusted for risk.  Risk-
adjusted return refines an investment's return by measuring how much risk is required to 
produce a return. Some common risk measures include alpha, beta, R-squared, standard 
deviation and the Sharpe ratio. 
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From a policy perspective, we should consider the possible implications 
if OPEC were to pursue a different approach forgoing its role in market 
stabilisation.  Greater price volatility would most affect the risk adjusted 
returns of higher-cost exploration and production activity, eventually 
leading to less investment and output. Given the lower risk-tolerance of 
shale and other high cost producers and their reliance upon private capital, 
it may make sense for OPEC to end its commitment to stable markets. As 
explored in the industrial organisation literature, the burden of managing 
risk may be a barrier to entry (Leautier & Rochet, 2014).  In theory at least, 
rather than stabilising prices, OPEC could protect its position by using its 
discretionary buffer in a pro-cyclic manner, to increase market volatility, 
making investment in high-cost exploration and product, on a risk-adjusted 
basis, less attractive. The pursuit of such a strategy would have big 
implications for global oil markets and make them less secure. Our 
observations hearken back to the insights of the late Professor Adelman 
who argued that “sowing confusion” in oil markets might actually be 
strategically useful (Adelman, 1972).   
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